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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
The Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision on May 5, 2005, upholding the

decision of the District Court issued April 9, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a), and Rules of Appellate Procedure 46(a)(3) and (a)(4).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Question Presented for Review.

Whether the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the standard governing a
motion to disqualify trial counsel under Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in
weighing the hardship to the client against the prejudice suffered by the opposing party?
This issue was preserved before the Court of Appeals and before the trial
court. SunCrest, L.L.C. ("SunCrest") first raised with the trial court the issue of
disqualification of Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. ("Snuffer") under Rule 3.7 as a
necessary witness by its Motion and Memorandum to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. ("Motion") on February
19,2004. (R. 2144-42; 2216-145). D.J. Investment Group L.L.C. ("D.J.
Investment") filed its Memorandum in Opposition to SunCrest's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on February
25, 2004 ("Opposition"). (R. 2278-17). SunCrest filed its Reply on March 10,
2004 ("Reply"). (R. 2415-295). On April 7, 2004, the district court heard oral
argument, (R. 2445; R. 2771 at pp. 1-50), and issued a written order denying
SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer on April 9, 2004. (R. 2454-46). A copy
of the district court's ruling is provided in SunCrest's Addendum at Tab 1.
1

SunCrest filed its Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on April 29, 2004. The Court
of Appeals handed down its decision on May 5, 2005. SunCrest filed a Petition
for Certiorari with this Court on June 6, 2005.
B.

Standard of Review.

The issue on which Certiorari was granted is one of law and is therefore subject to
review de novo by this Court. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("in order to weigh the district court's exercise of its discretion [the appellate
court] must resolve several purely legal questions," including the trial court's
interpretation of an attorney disciplinary rule under a "de novo" review); State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932,937 (Utah 1994) (Utah appellate courts "generally consider de novo a trial
court's statement of the legal rule"); Weeks v. Ind. Schools Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d
1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000) ("We review de novo the trial court's interpretation of the
applicable rules of professional responsibility."); LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 876
P.2d 184, 187 (Kan. App. 1994) ("[A] trial court's interpretation of a disciplinary rule is
subject to a de novo review."); State v. Barnett 965 P.2d 323, 327 (N.M. 1998) ("[T]he
abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate court from correcting errors
premised on the trial court's misapprehension of the law.")
Under the de novo standard, the appellate court must "apply [its] own independent
judgment" to the trial court's interpretation of an attorney disciplinary rule. In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d at 1488.

2

III.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW.
This Brief does not require determinative application of specific provisions of the

Utah Constitution or Utah Code. It is concerned with the interpretation and application
of Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and interpretive case authority. That
Rule reads as follows:
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as witness.
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which another lawyer in the
lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by
Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Procedural History

This is an appeal from the district court's denial of SunCrest's Motion to
Disqualify Snuffer and his firm as D.J. Investment's counsel in the action underlying this
appeal. (R. 2454-46). The underlying litigation involves, inter alia, a dispute over the
meaning of paragraph 14 of the November 16, 2000 Settlement Agreement ("Settlement
Agreement" or "Agreement") between SunCrest and D.J. Investment. (R. 793-85; R.
2215). SunCrest believed the language of the Settlement Agreement was clear and
unambiguous and, in light of the Agreement's integration clause, no parol evidence

would be admitted at trial. (R. 1667; 1652; 1647-46; 1637; 1614; 1551). D.J. Investment
took a similar view, although differing on the question of what paragraph 14 meant. On
November 17, 2003, the district court found paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement
ambiguous, making parol evidence as to its meaning admissible. (R. 2004-03).
In response to the trial court's November 17 decision, SunCrest filed its Motion to
Disqualify Snuffer on April 19, 2004. SunCrest asked the court to disqualify Mr. Snuffer
as trial counsel on the grounds that its November decision made it likely that Snuffer was
now a necessary witness within the meaning of Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct (R. 2144-42; R. 2216-145).1 On April 9, 2004, Judge Lynn Davis
denied SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer. (R. 2454-46). The district court
acknowledged that Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. could well implicate Rule
3.7 but nonetheless declined to disqualify Snuffer because it found the motion untimely,
and because Snuffer's disqualification would create a significant hardship for D.J.
Investment. (R. 2452).
On April 29, 2004, SunCrest filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order. (R. 2484-82). The Petition was granted and assigned to the Court of
Appeals. (R. 2507). Following briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals handed
down its opinion on May 5, 2005. A copy of that opinion is attached at Tab 2.

On February 6, 2004, SunCrest's counsel sent Snuffer a letter giving notice that
SunCrest intended file a Motion to Disqualify unless Snuffer withdrew as trial counsel, a
copy of that letter is at Tab 3.
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B.

Statement of Facts,
1. Initiation of the Underlying Lawsuit.

D.J. Investment and SunCrest entered into the Agreement on November 16, 2000,
resolving then pending disputes between them. (R. 793-85; R. 2215).2 The underlying
lawsuit began May 7, 2001, when D.J. Investment filed suit seeking, inter alia, rescission
of the November 2000 Agreement. (R. 149; R. 2215). The gravamen of that suit, as
expressed in D.J. Investment's Second Amended Complaint, is the allegation that, in
paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement, SunCrest promised to build a road for D.J.
Investment south from SunCrest's property across land owned by Micron Technology,
Inc. ("Micron") down to S.R. 92. D.J. Investment alleges that, during the negotiations
leading to the Settlement Agreement, SunCrest falsely represented that it owned certain
easements for a roadway across Micron's property. (R. 806, R. 2215). D.J. Investment
claimed that its reliance on SunCrest's alleged representations during settlement
negotiations was essential to its acceptance of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 806, R.
2215). SunCrest denies that it promised to build D.J. Investment a road. SunCrest did
agree to permit D.J. Investment to connect to any southern road SunCrest built
connecting its property to S.R. 92.
On November 17, 2003, in response to a motion by D.J. Investment for partial
summary judgment, the district court held that paragraph 14 of the Agreement was
ambiguous and stated that the court would admit parol evidence to clarify the meaning of

2 Those disputes are irrelevant to this appeal and largely unrelated to the present
litigation between the parties. (R. 793; R. 2215).

that paragraph. (R. 2004-03). As a result of that ruling, it became clear for the first time
that the testimony of all those present during the negotiations culminating in the
November Settlement Agreement would be necessary for trial. (R. 2215-14).
2.

The Settlement Negotiations,

The negotiations leading to the Settlement Agreement took place over roughly a
two-month period. (R. 2214; R. 2172). D.J. Investment was represented during these
negotiations by:
(a) Denver Snuffer (D.J. Investment's counsel);
(b) David Mast ("Mast") (D.J. Investment's primary member and manager); and
(c) Robert Christiansen ("Christiansen") (Vice President of U.S. General, Inc.).3
(R. 2214, R. 2172, R. 2165).
The parties reached an initial agreement memorialized on November 10, 2000.
(D.J. Investment refers to this as the interim agreement. It does not include paragraph
14.) Subsequent discussions led to the final Agreement executed on November 16, 2000,
which is the subject of the underlying lawsuit.
The initial agreement was the result of an all-night negotiating session beginning
November 9, 2000 and lasting into the early morning hours of November 10th. (R. 2413,
R. 2398-99). D.J. Investment was represented at this negotiating session by Snuffer and
Christiansen. (R. 2413, R. 2399). (SunCrest was represented by Edward Grampp
3

US General is wholly owned by Mast, and joined in the Settlement Agreement. (R.
000786).

6

("Grampp"), Bruce R. Baird ("Baird") and Michael F. Jones ("Jones"). (R. 2413, R.
2394). Grampp was SunCrest's Vice President. Baird and Jones were SunCrest's
counsel. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Mast did not attend this meeting. (R. 2214, R. 2399). At
the beginning of the meeting on November 9, SunCrest offered D.J. Investment $50,000
if the parties completed the Agreement during this session. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Snuffer
stated that D.J. intended to finish the negotiations during that session to obtain the
$50,000. (R. 2413, R. 2399).
During the November 9 session, Snuffer negotiated nearly every sentence of the
initial agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Although Christiansen testified that the two sides
discussed the substance of paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement during this
meeting, (R. 2214, R. 2162), he was unable to recall any of the details of the meeting.
(R. 2214, R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer was D.J. Investment's only other representative at
the meeting. During this session, the parties completed the substantive portions of the
Settlement Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Therefore Snuffer is the only person who
can testify for D.J. Investment on the discussions - if there were any - surrounding what
became paragraph 14 of the final Agreement during this critical initial session. (R.
2210).
Snuffer was not merely a passive witness. (R. 2413, R. 2399-98). Throughout the
November 9/10 session, Snuffer, Baird, and Jones made changes to the Settlement
Agreement on Snuffer's computer. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Moreover, Snuffer drafted some
of the language independently. (R. 2413, R. 2398). At the conclusion of the session, the
parties had completed the substantive portions of the Agreement, agreeing on nearly
7

every provision of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2398). Because the parties
had completed the substantive portions of the Agreement within the required time frame,
SunCrest agreed to and paid D.J. Investment $50,000 for completion of an agreement.
(R. 2412, R. 2398).
Snuffer then sent the Settlement Agreement to Mast in Phoenix. (R. 2412, R.
2398). Mast, however, refused to honor the Agreement until minor changes were made.4
(R. 2412, R. 2398). Consequently, Grampp and Baird flew to Phoenix on November 14,
2000 to meet with Mast and address his new concerns. (R. 2412, R. 2398). On more
than one occasion during this session, Snuffer participated by speakerphone. (R. 2412, R.
2398-97). Snuffer and Mast apparently viewed the changes as insignificant since Snuffer
did not represent his client in person nor did he participate in the entire meeting by
phone. Because of the minor nature of these changes, SunCrest did not rescind the bonus
for reaching the agreement on November 10th. (R. 2412, R. 2398).5 The parties
finalized the Settlement Agreement during the Phoenix meeting, and Mast signed it on
November 16th. (R. 2412, R. 2398-97).
In addition to his participation in the negotiations of the Settlement Agreement,
Snuffer also communicated extensively with SunCrest, both before and after the
settlement. (R. 2214). Prior to SunCrest's purchasing the land for the SunCrest
4

Christiansen had full authority to execute on behalf of D.J. Investment. Mast's
signature was therefore unnecessary.
5 The few changes made to the Settlement Agreement in Phoenix mostly involved
minor word changes, but the substance of the agreement, reached during the meeting at
Snuffer's offices, did not change. (R. 2412, R. 2398).

8

development, Snuffer discussed the Micron easements in detail - a key issue in the
underlying lawsuit - with Jeff Anderson, president of SunCrest Development
Corporation (the developer of SunCrest's property). (R. 2214-13, R. 2159). In addition,
Snuffer corresponded with a number of parties regarding the alignment of the road
proposed to connect to S.R. 92. (R. 2213, R. 2157-45). Prior to either of the November
negotiating sessions, Snuffer wrote SunCrest a letter acknowledging that he and his client
possessed conflicting information regarding the easements across Micron's property:
We have been told of its existence (although Micron denies it) but have
never been furnished a copy of it.
(R. 2403-02).6 Mast and Christiansen both testified that they did not speak with Micron
during this period. The obvious, and ineluctable, inference is that Snuffer himself
obtained this information from Micron. (R. 2413, R. 2403-02).
3.

Motion to Disqualify.

On November 17, 2003, the district court ruled on D.J. Investment's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The district court denied the motion but
declared paragraph 14 of the Agreement ambiguous, ruling that parol evidence
would be admitted to clarify that paragraph's meaning. (R. 2004-03). In light of
the trial court's ruling, SunCrest concluded that it was likely that it would need
Snuffer's testimony regarding the settlement negotiations and regarding
representations and/or reliance on representation concerning any easement over
Micron property in order to fully present the facts necessary to resolve the

The grants at issue are publicly recorded documents. (R. 1545-19).
9

underlying dispute. (R. 2215-14; R. 2210). D.J. Investment's principal (David
Mast) did not attend the negotiating session at Snuffer's offices where the parties
reached agreement on the substantive portions of the Agreement and,
consequently, cannot testify about those negotiations. (R. 2214, R. 2413, R.
2399). Christiansen, the only other D.J. Investment representative to attend the
first set of negotiations, testified unequivocally that he does not remember the
details of the negotiating session. (R. 2214, R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer was D.J.
Investment's only other representative at the meeting. (R. 2210). Thus, Snuffer's
testimony will likely be necessary to the interpretation of paragraph 14 of the
Agreement (to the extent parole evidence concerning the provision is ultimately
admissible).
In light of the district court's November 17th ruling, Snuffer's testimony became
necessary to resolve the underlying dispute over paragraph 14. SunCrest therefore
promptly filed its Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and Snuffer's firm on February 19, 2004.
(R. 2144-42; 2216-145). On April 7, 2004, the court heard oral argument on the Motion
(R. 2445; R. 2771 at pp. 1-50), and on April 9, 2004, issued its ruling denying SunCresf s
Motion. (R. 2454-46). The district court acknowledged that Snuffer's continued
representation of D.J. Investment could well implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. Order atffl[3 & 5 (Tab 2). Nevertheless, the district court
declined to disqualify Snuffer on the grounds that the motion was untimely and that
Snuffer's disqualification would impose a significant hardship on D.J. Investment. (R.
2452).
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The heart of the underlying litigation is a dispute over the interpretation of a single
paragraph in an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant. Early in the case,
plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the meaning of the disputed paragraph.
The trial court denied the motion, holding the paragraph to be ambiguous. As a result,
the testimony of all those who participated in the negotiation of the agreement, and the
disputed paragraph in particular, became more important. Denver Snuffer, counsel for
plaintiff, not only was directly involved in the negotiation, he is the only witness for the
plaintiff who may be able to testify concerning the substance of the negotiations leading
to the disputed paragraph. All of plaintiff s other witnesses have disavowed recollection
of those specific negotiations. Consequently, Snuffer is likely to be a necessary witness
at trial.
Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires disqualification of an
attorney who is likely to be a necessary witness. Shortly after the trial court's decision,
SunCrest moved to disqualify Snuffer under Rule 3.7. The trial court denied SunCrest's
motion on the grounds, inter alia, that doing so would impose a substantial burden on the
plaintiff, D.J. Investment. The trial court did not consider the burdens Snuffer's
continuation as trial counsel would impose on SunCrest or on the tribunal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court, again finding that a significant burden would fall on
Snuffer's client if he were to be disqualified as trial counsel. The Court of Appeals,
however, failed to consider any burden imposed on SunCrest or on the court as a result of
Snuffer's appearance as both counsel and witness.
11

Rule 3.7 requires a balancing of burdens. The burdens on the client if the attorney
is disqualified are to be balanced against the burdens which would be imposed on the
adverse party and on the tribunal if the attorney is permitted to appear both as trial
counsel and as a witness. Rule 3.7, Comment ("a balancing is required"). The Court of
Appeals did not engage in any balancing. It did not consider any burden other than that
which might fall on Snuffer's client. The Court of Appeals did not consider the burdens
on and prejudice to SunCrest should Snuffer appear both as trial counsel and as witness.
The Court of Appeals also did not consider the difficulty which would face the tribunal,
nor to the risk of confusion for the jury when Snuffer is both a witness and an advocate.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO BALANCE THE INTERESTS OF
ALL OF THE PARTIES, AS REQUIRED BY RULE 3.7.
A lawyer must be disqualified from serving as trial counsel where the lawyer is or

is likely to be a necessary witness in the case unless "[disqualification of the lawyer
would work a substantial hardship on the client." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.7. The
determination of whether the client would suffer a substantial hardship is neither
mechanical nor acontextual. To make that determination, "a balancing is required
between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." Utah R. Prof.
Conduct 3.7, Comment. Thus, a court facing a request for disqualification of trial
counsel must, at the least, consider the relative burdens and interests of both the client
and the adverse (or moving) party.

12

The Court of Appeals, like the trial court, concluded that D.J. Investment would
suffer a "substantial hardship" if Snuffer were to be disqualified as trial counsel. Both
courts came to that conclusion by a legally mistaken analysis - an assumption of hardship
to the client and consideration of that fact alone. Neither court attempted to balance the
interests and burdens of all parties, although that is exactly what Rule 3.7 requires.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not consider the burden on SunCrest in any form (a
legal error). See Opinion at 1 4 & 5 (Tab 2). Instead, the Court of Appeals considered
only the hardship which D.J. Investment might conceivably suffer. Id. This one-sided
and truncated analysis is inconsistent with the plain language of Rule 3.7 and with the
o

intent of the Rule as expressed by the Committee notes. It is a mistake of law.
A balancing where only the interests of one party (the client) are considered is not
a balancing at all. That analysis not only ignores Rule 3.7's requirement that the interests
of all parties be considered and balanced, it also renders Rule 3.7 a nullity: a party will
always suffer some hardship if its trial counsel is disqualified, even if the disqualification
occurs years before trial (as is the case here). If the loss of one's chosen counsel is the
only interest considered, the loss will always be substantial because there is no
comparison.
7 Because no court has ever made a determination of whether Snuffer is a necessary
witness, it is difficult to see how a court could properly weigh the respective interests SunCrest's interests are not even acknowledged so the harm to it of permitting Snuffer to
appear both as a witness and trial counsel has never been assessed.
8 The error is even starker considered in light of the amendments to Rule 3.7 which
become effective November 1 of this year.

n

A.

The Courts Below Failed To Consider That SunCrest Will Suffer
Substantial Hardship And Prejudice If Snuffer Is Permitted to Appear
Both As A Witness And As Trial Counsel.

Disqualification under Rule 3.7 entails consideration of the hardship and prejudice
suffered by the moving party and by the court, as well as that suffered by the opposing
party. Rule 3.7, Comment (balancing "required"). SunCrest will be prejudiced if Snuffer
is permitted to appear both as trial counsel and as a witness at trial.9 SunCrest will suffer
"substantial hardship," and that hardship must be, but was never considered by the courts
below. The burden on SunCrest takes several forms.
Permitting a lawyer to appear both as trial counsel and as a fact witness in the
same case will be confusing for the jury. In one role, Mr. Snuffer will be an advocate,
arguing the reliability and integrity of (other) witnesses, objecting to questions and
answers, and arguing legal questions. In that role, he will make his opening and closing
arguments, in each discussing the evidence, and in the latter arguing for a particular
interpretation of the evidence and assessments of the (other) witnesses. Only attorneys
fill this role at trial; only attorneys have leave to argue the evidence to the jury.
In the second role, Snuffer will be like any other witness. He will take the stand
and be examined and cross-examined. But, unlike any other witness, he will make his
own objections to questions. And, unlike any other witness, he will cross-examine

9 "That counsel should avoid appearing both as advocate and witness except under
special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah
1985) interpreting prior Rule 5-102(A)) (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669,
671 (7th Cir. 1983). "The great weight of authority [] is that it is error for counsel to
continue representation where he or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues
that are not incidental or insignificant." Id.

1 A

himself. All of this special conduct - and there is no doubt that it will be special conduct,
quite unlike any other witness - will inevitably give his testimony undue weight with the
jury, and his arguments as an advocate undue weight as well. The very fact of his
testimony lends credibility to his legal arguments. After all, he, unlike opposing counsel,
witnessed it all. That dual role prejudices to SunCrest, creating a substantial and unfair
burden.
While this double role might in theory allow Snuffer to "be more easily subject to
impeachment for interest and thus lessens his effectiveness as a witness," it will certainly
disadvantage SunCrest. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 (quoting Commonwealth v. Floyd, 431
A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. 1981)); see World Youth Day v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297,
1303 (N.D.Colo. 1994); Merrill Lynch Fin. Bus, v. Novell., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1174
(D.Colo. 2003); Miller v. Colo. Farms, Action No. 97-WY-2015-WD, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7553 (D. Colo., May 30, 2001). As the United States District Court noted, "the underlying
purpose of Rule 3.7 . . . is to avoid the prejudice associated with the jury confusion
resulting from an attorney acting as both advocate and witness." World Youth Day, 866
F. Supp. at 1303.
That purpose will be entirely frustrated if the court refuses to weigh the hardship
to the moving party. The Rule will have no meaning if the parties are required to wait
until after the trial is over before jury confusion is addressed, yet that seems the only
alternative left open by the Court of Appeals.
To answer that confusion is a mere possibility, that a lawyer filling a double role
mightbz less credible than other witnesses will not do. It is at least as likely that the
15

lawyer will make for a more credible witness merely because he remains before the jury
throughout the case and is positioned to argue for his own credibility at every stage. A
priori, of course, we cannot know how a jury will react to a lawyer fulfilling two roles.
But that is precisely the point - permitting such an event invites prejudicial jury
confusion. The risk of such prejudice should be refused. As Rule 3.7 makes clear, the
presumption properly is that a lawyer in a double role should not be permitted. A court
considering only the potential inconvenience (or hardship) to the attorney's client thereby
elides the equally or more important consideration of hardship on the moving party. That
is exactly what happed here. The Court of Appeals did not merely mis-weigh the
burdens, it failed even to consider the burdens on SunCrest.
B.

The Opinions Below Also Ignore The Substantial Burden on the
Tribunal.

The double role of trial counsel appearing as a witness also places unusual burdens
on the judicial system and on the court. These burdens also should be (but were not)
considered in weighing the balance of hardships, as required under Rule 3.7. If Snuffer
appears both as trial counsel and as a witness, the trial court will need to remind the jury
each time Snuffer changes roles exactly which role he is then fulfilling and that his
double roles must not affect their views about either the rest of the case or about
Snuffer's fulfillment of either of the roles. This procedure cannot help but create
confusion and involve the court in constant intrusions into the parties' presentations of
their respective cases.
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This Court has recognized the extraordinary burden imposed on a court when
counsel acts both as an advocate and as a witness. Proposed Rule 3.7, Comment 2 (Tab
4). The changes in Rule 3.7, as effective in November 2005, are not substantive
alterations, but rather constitute minor clarifications. The new Comments do not mark
substantive transformations but instead provide further clarification of the import of Rule
3.7 and its intended application. The new Comments give express recognition of factors
which the courts were always to have considered in deciding a motion to disqualify under
Rule 3.7. The burden on the adverse party, always expressly noted in the Comments,
entailed exactly such burdens on the tribunal as well. See Comments 2, 3 (Tab 4).
Because these burdens are also substantial, they are substantial hardships on the tribunal.
Allowing Snuffer to proceed in this double role will make the court's decisions
with respect to objections to evidence (and other legal questions) appear assessments of
Snuffer's credibility as a witness. That, in turn, will invoke still more commentary by the
court concerning counsel. The court will be involved in an endless cycle of
distinguishing for the jury between Snuffer as advocate and Snuffer as witness. That
conflict comes into starkest contrast when Snuffer takes the stand as a witness - how
does the trial court arrange for his cross-examination, and for him to object to questions
he is being asked?10 Will Snuffer hop off the stand for each question posed on behalf of

10 If Snuffer has co-counsel who handles his examination, then co-counsel should be
able to handle the remainder of the trial, and Snuffer's disqualification would not work a
substantial hardship on D.J. Investment sufficient to outweigh the hardship on SunCrest
and the trial court.
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his client? Is he to object from the witness box, or step down and do this? This situation
is simply unworkable.
II.

THE HARDSHIP ON SNUFFER'S CLIENT IS AFFECTED BY THE
STATUS OF THE CASE WHEN THE MOTION IS MADE..
Consideration of a motion to disqualify trial counsel pursuant to Rule 3.7 requires

the court to consider the burden disqualification would impose on the disqualified
attorney's client and the burdens on the adverse party and the tribunal. Rule 3.7,
Comment O'a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the
opposing party"). The nature and weight of the hardship on the attorney's client varies
dramatically with the nature of the case and, more importantly, the status of the case.
The Court of Appeals failed to even consider the procedural posture in its opinion.
Because the Court of Appeals treated any hardship to Snuffer's client as substantial
hardship, it effectively found that the disqualification alone would always be a burden
sufficient to justify denial of a motion under Rule 3.7, no matter how far the case was
from trial. Opinion at 3 (discussing only the burden on DJ. Investment) (Tab 1). That
interpretation of the hardship exception renders the Rule pointless.
The potential burden on Snuffer's client varies dramatically depending on when
the motion to disqualify is brought, the nature of the case, the number of other attorneys
on the trial team, etc. In this instance, for example, the motion was brought early in the
case. The trial court denied SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify in April 2004. Discovery in
the case continued until the end of September 2005, almost a year and half. In fact, the
greater portion of discovery occurred after the trial court denied SunCrest's Motion. The
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point is that disqualification at an early stage of litigation must involve a lower burden on
the client than would disqualification on the eve of trial. Indeed, all of the cases SunCrest
has found denying disqualification, and most of the cases granting or upholding
disqualification, involved motions brought between the close of discovery and trial. (A
marked contrast to this case, where the motion was brought early in discovery.) Transfer
to new trial counsel11 when the case is early in discovery is far less burdensome than is
transfer just before trial. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court even allowed for
this possibility.
Similarly, disqualification just before trial does and should weigh differently when
it would be disqualification of the sole attorney rather than one of a large team. The
reason is clear - there is a lesser burden on the client where other attorneys are already
familiar with the case. The same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandus, to weighing
burdens when the case is ready for trial and when it is in the early stages of discovery.
Transition to new trial counsel in the early stages of discovery is, obviously, far less
burdensome than on the eve of trial.
The failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to consider these issues is
fatal to the Opinion below, not because the Court of Appeals failed to give the proper
weight to these factors (or to the hardship on SunCrest), or because it assigned too much
weight to the possible hardship on Snuffer's client. The failure is fatal because the Court

11 It should be noted that disqualification of an attorney under Rule 3.7 as trial counsel
does not require the attorney to withdraw from the case entirely. He or she may still
participate in case preparation, motion work, etc.
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of Appeals did not consider these factors at all, and so did not balance the respective
hardships.
The burden on Snuffer's client cannot properly be weighed against the burden on
either the trial court or on SunCrest without reaching the nature of the testimony which
makes it likely that Snuffer will be a necessary witness. The court must make that
determination as a prerequisite to the weighing, not only because the Rule as written
requires such a finding, but because the finding is essential to the weighing of hardships
and burdens mandated under the Rule. To see this distinction, one need only consider
that the attorney might, for example, be a necessary witness for one out of sixteen causes
of action, or a necessary witness as to all sixteen. The burdens in the two scenarios are
rather different.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals gives no hint of these considerations, nor
does the order of the trial court. In effect, the Court of Appeals found that any burden
was too much of a burden under 3.7. That decision is error, a mistake of law.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals did not "mis-apply" the balancing test required under Rule
3.7. It did not fail to assign the proper weight to one burden or another. The issue here is
not that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the evidence in a light SunCrest favors.
The error below is of a different kind. The Court of Appeals, like the trial court before it,
did not engage in any balancing test at all. The Court of Appeals did not balance the
burden on or prejudice to SunCrest because it did not consider them. It treated the
burden to D.J. Investment as the sole factor to be considered: if there was a burden to D.J.

Investment, then the burden was substantial and necessarily outweighed any and all
burdens to SunCrest, or to the tribunal (and to the jury).
If Rule 3.7 has any meaning at all, the opinion of the Court of Appeals must be
rejected. Every disqualification of counsel imposes a significant burden on the client.
The client loses its chosen advocate and must incur the costs of new counsel learning the
case. But, pace the Court of Appeals, that cannot be the end of analysis under Rule 3.7.
The interests of and burdens on the opposing party must also be considered. The burdens
on the trial court and the jury must be weighed. Finding a significant burden on the client
is only the start of analysis, not the end. The Court of Appeals considered only the
potential burden on D.J. Investment. In so doing, it eviscerated Rule 3.7, and made an
error of law.
SunCrest respectfully requests that this Court reverse the opinion below.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2005.
HOWREY LLP
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801)533-8383
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

D.J. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company,

RULING ON DAE/WESTBROOK L.L.C'S
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DENVER C.
SNUFFER, JR. AND NELSON SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C., a Delaware limited,
liability company; DRAPER CITY, a municipal
corporation; JOHN DOES 1 to 15,

Civil No. 010402305
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer
Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen. Oral arguments were held on April 7,2004. Richard
Casey appeared on behalf of DAE/Westbrook ("Westbrook") and Denver Snuffer appeared on
behalf of D.J. Investment Group ("D.J."). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully
considered the Motions and Memoranda of the Parties now makes the following ruling.
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I.
FACTUAL SUMMARY & RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. In October 2000 Westbrook entered D.J.'s property and began building a roadway in order to
conform with city regulations that required communities of 20+ dwellings to have more than one
road leading to and from the community.
2. D.J. filed a lawsuit in the 4th District Court to abate what it considered to be a trespass on the
part of Westbrook and also sued for damages.
3. On November 16,2000 in Phoenix, Arizona, the parties created a multifaceted agreement
containing, among other things, provisions dismissing D.J.'s lawsuit and allowing Westbrook to
continue using the access road on D.J.'s property. Denver Snuffer ("Snuffer"), D.J.'s attorney,
participated, either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation the agreement.
4. Provision 14 of the agreement allowed D.J. the use of a not-yet-created "Southerly Roadway"
that would be located on Micron property abutting D.J.'s property. The original route
contemplated would give D.J. access to State Road 92 by way of this "Southerly Road."
5. Despite Westbrook's representations that it had secured the necessary easements to construct
the Southerly Roadway, the rights to these easements may not have been obtained and Westbrook
is now preparing to build the Southerly Highway along a different route that does not provide D.J.
with any access to State Road 92. On May 7, 2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of the
settlement agreement and began this current litigation.
6. On June 8,2001, Westbrook filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint.
7. On December 20, 2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
8. Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2003.
9. D.J. filed its Reply to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on
February 5, 2003.
10. On August 7,2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
11. On August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
12. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
August 27, 2003. Richard Casey appeared on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared
on behalf of D.J. At the conclusion of Oral Arguments the Court took the matter under
2

advisement.
13. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the November 16, 2000
settlement agreement. The corresponding Order denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was signed andfiledon January 7, 2004.
14. On February 19, 2004, Westbrook filed a Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
15. On February 25, 2004, D.J.filedits Memorandum in Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
16. After being granted additional time to respond to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C, Westbrook filed its
Reply to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on March 17,2004.
17. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on April 7, 2004. Richard Casey appeared
on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared on behalf of D.J.
18. Denver Snuffer has served as D.J.'s counsel in the case at bar from the inception of the
original litigation to the present time.
II.
ANALYSIS

Westbrook contends this Court should disqualify Snuffer in the case at bar because
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this litigation violates Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. D.J. argues this Court should not disqualify Snuffer because Snuffer is not
a necessary witness in the case at bar and disqualifying Snuffer at this point in the litigation would
inflict substantial hardship on D.J. Although Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in the case
at bar may implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court declines to
disqualify Snuffer because Westbrook's request is untimely and would inflict significant hardship
on D.J.
3

A.

SNUFFER'S ACTIONS IN THE CASE AT BAR IMPLICATE RULE 3.7

Westbrook alleges that Snuffer's representation of D.J. in the case at bar violates Rule 3.7
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the
client.
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

3.7. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the prohibition

against serving as counsel and witness and indicated that "[i]f an attorney attempts to combine the
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both as
advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard,
707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985). The Leonard Court also indicated that "application of this rule
does not depend on whether an attorney will be called b u t . . . on whether he 'ought to be called as
a witness' in the underlying action." Id.
D.J. notes that Rule 3.7 only applies when an attorney is a necessary witness during the
trial. Snuffer, D.J. contends, is not a necessary witness and therefore should not be disqualified. A
lawyer is generally only considered a necessary witness "if his or her testimony is relevant, material
and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1302
(D. Colo. 1994). Furthermore, Utah courts have indicated that disqualification of a lawyer may
not be necessary if his or her testimony only relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues. Leonard,
101 P.2d at 653.
The factual disputes between the parties make it difficult for the Court to make a
4

conclusive determination as to whether Snuffer was sufficiently involved in the settlement
negotiations to warrant his designation as a "necessary" witness in the case at bar. Although
Westbrook and D.J. provide very different renditions of Snuffer's role in the negotiations leading
up to the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement, both accounts demonstrate that Snuffer was
present during many of the negotiation sessions and advised David Mast and Robert Christensen
on matters related to such settlement negotiations. While Snuffer's involvement may have
rendered him a "necessary" witness in the case at bar, this Court holds that it does not need to
reach such a determination because the facts of this litigation give rise to the "special
circumstances" exception contemplated in Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
B.

DISQUALIFYING SNUFFER WOULD "WORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP" ON D.J.

Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct will not prevent a lawyer from
advocating at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness if "[disqualification of
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.7. In order to determine whether a client will suffer a "substantial hardship," "a balancing is
required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." UTAH RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R.

3.7, Comment.

This Court, after the weighing the interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer at
this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J. The case at bar wasfiledin
May of 2001, almost three years ago, and since that time the parties have vigorously litigated an
extraordinary number of legal issues. The Court also notes that the parties have conducted a
significant amount of discovery in connection with this litigation. Most, if not all, of the key
witnesses have been deposed and written discovery has been sent out and answered by both
5

parties. All things considered, the parties have engaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed,
the Court file now fills seven exceptionally thick folders and addresses some very complex legal
issues. The Clerk of the Court has just opened the eighth file. Under these circumstances, the
Court doubts another attorney could be brought up to speed in this matter and recognizes that
such an effort would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant amount of time and money.
Furthermore, this Court believes that Westbrook could have significantly reduced the costs
of bringing new counsel up to speed if Westbrook had filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver
Snuffer in a more timely fashion. In Zion 's First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc.,
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately filed
and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification."
In Jensen jhz Utah Court of Appeals held that Jensen's Motion to Disqualify Counsel was
untimely because it was filed more than seven months after counsel's first appearance and more
than three months after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict. In contrast to Jensen,
Westbrook's own pleadings intimate that Westbrook has "reasonably foreseen," since the initiation
of this litigation, that Snuffer might be called, as a witness in the case at bar.
Westbrook argues that Snuffer only became a "necessary" witness in this litigation at the
time the Court indicated that it would accept parole evidence regarding the settlement agreement.
Even if Westbrook's argument is accepted as true this Court can still find Westbrook's filing was
untimely. Westbrook filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer on February 19, 2004, roughly
three months after the Court's November 17, 2003 decision to accept parole evidence on the
settlement agreement at issue. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals held Jensen's Motion to
Disqualify Counsel was untimely because it was filed "more than three months" after Jensen
6

became aware of the potential conflict." Jensen 781 P.2d at 481. Similarly, this Court could find
that Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer was untimely because it was filed more
than three months after Westbrook became aware of the Court's decision to accept parole
evidence regarding the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement.
But the Court must examine the entire procedural history to determine timeliness. One can
argue very persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of thefilingof the lawsuit that the
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation of the
language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer participated in that
settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001)
More importantly at the time of thefilingof Summary Judgment/Partial Summary
Judgment, defendants were placed on notice that plaintiffs intended to rely on a variety of
collateral documents (renderings, blueprints, bonds, etc.) to show the alignment of the subject
road. (Date: December 20, 2002). If that were not enough, at oral argument on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, this position became abundantly clear. (Date: August 27, 2003).
Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer from the case at bar would result in significant
financial and tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light of Westbrook's untimely filing of its Motion to
Disqualify, this Court rejects Westbrook's motion and declines to disqualify Denver Snuffer from
this litigation.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. Plaintiffs counsel is
7

instructed to prepare an order consistent with the findings contained herein.

DATED this f^

day of April, 2004.
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
fl
Appellant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. (Westbrook)1 argues that the
trial court erred by denying its Motion to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer Jr. and the law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen,
P.C. (collectively Snuffer). We affirm.
%2 On November 16, 2000, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement, which dismissed D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C.'s (D.J.)
lawsuit against Westbrook. Snuffer, attorney for D.J., was
involved in the negotiations leading to the settlement agreement.
On May 7, 2 001, D.J. rescinded the settlement agreement and filed
suit against Westbrook. Nearly three years later, Westbrook
filed a Motion to Disqualify Snuffer, relying primarily on Utah

1. Since filing its Motion to Disqualify, Westbrook has changed
its name to SunCrest, L.L.C.

Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. The trial court denied the
Motion to Disqualify, and Westbrook subsequently filed this
interlocutory appeal.
f3
The standard of review generally for decisions relating to
disqualification is abuse of discretion, unless the court is
called upon to resolve solely a legal or ethical issue. See
Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998)
(holding that because no issues of fact were presented to the
trial court, "to the extent this [c]ourt has a special interest
in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a
trial court's discretion is limited"). In contrast, "[w]here
courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual disputes, and
the quantity of less tangible factors implicating the trial
court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better
position to consider and weigh all those circumstances in their
application to the legal standard at issue." Id. (citing State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). The trial court's
ruling incorporates both questions of fact and law, and thus we
apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Margulies v.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1995) (where the trial
court's findings involve "mixed questions of fact and law . . . .
the proper standard of review . . . is the abuse of discretion
standard").
f4
Westbrook argues that the trial court erred by finding that
Snuffer's disqualification would work substantial hardship on
D.J. and by not balancing the interests of the parties.2
According to rule 3.7, "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness
except where . . . [d]isqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client." Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct
3.7(a) (emphasis added). In determining whether an attorney
should be disqualified on the grounds contemplated by rule 3.7,
the trial court is required to balance the client's interests
with those of the opposing party. See Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct 3.7

2. Westbrook also argues that the trial court erred by failing
to determine whether Snuffer was a necessary witness. However,
it was not essential that the trial court determine whether
Snuffer was a "necessary witness" under rule 3.7 of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct because, even if it had, the
hardship exception would have compelled the same result:
Snuffer's disqualification would force undue hardship upon D.J.

cmt. However, even if there is risk of prejudice to the opposing
party, "due regard must be given to the effect of
disqualification on the lawyer1s client." Id. (emphasis added).3
f5
Here, the trial court weighed the interests of the parties
and found that D.J. would face substantial hardship in both time
and money if forced to hire new counsel at such a late stage of
discovery. Specifically, the court noted that
[t]he case at bar was filed in May of 2001,
almost three years ago, and since that time
the parties have vigorously litigated an
extraordinary number of legal issues. The
[c]ourt also notes that the parties have
conducted a significant amount of discovery
in connection with this litigation. Most, if
not all, of the key witnesses have been
deposed and written discovery has been sent
out and answered by both parties. All things
considered, the parties have engaged in a
substantial amount of work. Indeed, the
[c]ourt file now fills seven exceptionally
thick folders and addresses some very complex
legal issues. The [c] lerk of the [c]ourt has
just opened the eighth file. Under these
circumstances, the [c]ourt doubts another
attorney could be brought up to speed in this
matter and recognizes that such an effort
would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant
amount of time and money.

3. When issues of professional discretion arise, the Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct call for self-governance. In particular,
the rules state,
Violation of a [r]ule should not give rise to
a cause of action, nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. The [r]ules are designed to
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed
to be a basis for civil liability.
Furthermore, the purpose of the [rjules can
be subverted when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons.
Utah R. Prof'1 Conduct Scope.

f6
The trial court also found that Westbrook filed its motion
in an untimely manner. We agree. A motion to disqualify counsel
is untimely when it is not "immediately filed and diligently
pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for
disqualification." Zions First Nat' 1 Bank v. Barbara Jensen
Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(emphasis added) (holding that the defendants' motion to
disqualify counsel was untimely because it was filed three months
after it learned of the representation, and one day before the
opponent's motion to compel settlement was scheduled for
hearing). Here the parties were aware that Snuffer would likely
be a necessary witness at least three months prior to filing
their motion, if not earlier.4 Thus, had Westbrook timely filed
its motion, it could have significantly reduced D.J.'s costs of
retaining and bringing new counsel up to speed.
f7
Because D.J. would face substantial hardship if forced to
retain new counsel at this late stage and Westbrook's motion to
disqualify Snuffer was untimely, we hold that the trial court
properly denied Westbrook's motion. Accordingly, we affirm.

QU^^L m. r&J£+^>
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
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WE CONCUR:

/^W^^^W^

Russell W.
Associate

Sgory K. Orme, Judge

4. At the time the underlying lawsuit was filed, both parties
were aware of Snuffer's participation in the settlement
agreement. Likewise, the parties were aware of Snuffer's
participation from the arguments presented for and against D.J.'s o
Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, even if Westbrook did not
believe that Snuffer was a necessary witness until the trial
court indicated parole evidence would be taken in regard to the
settlement agreement, Westbrook failed to file its Motion to
Disqualify until three months later.
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'ADMITTED IN TEXAS ONLY

VIA FAX
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq.
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
RE:

D. J. Investment v. DAE/Westbrook, LLC

Dear Denver:
Enclosed please find a copy of the motion we intend to file to disqualify you as counsel
for D. J. Investment in the above-entitled matter. We wanted to give you prior notice in case this
issue did not cross your mind before and give you a chance to withdraw prior to our filing this
motion. If we have missed an aspect of the law, we would be happy to discuss the issue with
you. If you do not choose to withdraw, we will file this motion next Friday.
Sincerely,
**y

Evelyn J. Furse

Stephen G. Crockett (0766)
Richard W. Casey (0590)
Evelyn J. Furse (8952)
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON,
GREENWOOD & CASEY, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Defendant
DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DJ. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C, a Utah )
limited liability company,
])
)
Plaintiff,
;)
)
vs.
]

DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C.'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DENVER C.
SNUFFER, JR. AND NELSON,
SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C, a Delaware
]> Civil No. 010402305
limited liability company; DRAPER CITY, a ;
municipal corporation; JOHN DOES 1 to 15, ]1 Honorable Lynn W. Davis
Defendants.

]

Defendant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. ("Westbrook"), by and through its attorneys of
record, hereby respectfully moves this Court for an order disqualifying Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.,
plaintiffs counsel, from participating in this case.
INTRODUCTION
In this lawsuit, Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. ("Snuffer") represents the plaintiff, DJ. Investment
Group, L.L.C. ("D.J."), and plaintiffs primary member and manager, David Mast ("Mast").
Snuffer also represented D.J. and Mast during the events underlying this litigation and more

specifically, was directly involved in the negotiations of the November 16, 2000 Settlement
Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"), that forms the center of this dispute. Snuffer, as one of
the main negotiators for D. J, is a key witness to a number of the events surrounding the
Settlement Agreement. Because Snuffer's testimony regarding these events will be critical in
resolving the dispute before this Court, Snuffer is a necessary witness in the present lawsuit.
Snuffer's dual representation of D.J., in both the present lawsuit and in the events underlying this
lawsuit, violates the ethical obligations imposed by Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct and taints any further proceedings in this matter. Therefore, Westbrook respectfully
moves this Court to disqualify Snuffer and his law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
from further participation in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 16, 2000, DJ. and Westbrook entered into a court-approved Settlement
Agreement settling prior litigation over property unrelated to the present lawsuit. See Settlement
Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A; DJ. Am. Compl. f 20. However, on May 7,2001, DJ.
filed suit seeking rescission of the Settlement Agreement, thus beginning this lawsuit. In its
Amended Complaint, D J. complains that during the settlement negotiations, Westbrook made
false representations regarding its easements running over property belonging to Micron
Technologies, Inc., ("Micron"). See id <f 20. In entering into the Settlement Agreement, D J.
claims it relied upon representations by Westbrook made during settlement negotiations
regarding those easements and the potential road alignment of SunCrest Drive, which was to
connect Westbrook's property to the Alpine Highway, S.R. U-92 ("S.R. U-92"). See id. ff 20,
22. The Court has found the paragraph relating to the road connecting with S.R. U-92
ambiguous and plans to allow parol evidence to clarify its meaning. Ruling on PL's Mot. to
2

Strike and Ruling on PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at 12. As a result, the
testimony of those present for the settlement negotiations is critical.
The negotiations leading to the Settlement Agreement took place over a roughly twomonth period. Deposition of David Mast, July 8, 2003 at 76 ("Mast Dep."), attached hereto as
Exhibit B. Snuffer was heavily involved in the negotiations, as it was he, along with Mast and
U.S. General's (another company owned by Mast) vice president, Bob Christiansen
("Christiansen"), who were the only negotiators for D.J. See id. at 75, Ex. B; see Deposition of
Robert Christiansen, July 2, 2003 at 21 ("Christiansen Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Snuffer also "collaborated" with Westbrook's then attorneys, Bruce R. Baird and Michael F.
Jones,1 on the drafts of the Settlement Agreement. Christiansen Dep. at 25, Ex. C. Specifically,
an agreement in principle along with an agreement as to the majority of the final settlement
document language was reached after an all-night negotiation and drafting session at Snuffer's
offices. Snuffer and Christiansen, but not Mast, were present at this meeting. Id at 28, Ex. C.
Christiansen testified that during this meeting the two sides discussed the "critical" paragraph 14
of the Agreement, which D.J. claims grants it access to S.R. U-92. Id, at 33, Ex. C. However,
Christiansen did not remember the details of this meeting. IdL at 28, 34, Ex. C. Additionally,
although not present during the Phoenix meeting, where the agreement was finalized, Snuffer
participated in the final negotiations by telephone conference calls and through e-mail. IdL at 25,
Ex.C.

1

Both Baird and Jones of Baird & Jones, L.C., represented Westbrook during the negotiations of the
Settlement Agreement and also participated in the drafting of the Settlement Agreement. (Baird and Jones still
represent Westbrook in the ongoing development of the SunCrest project.) Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones, who also
litigate many matters, realized the conflict that would arise if they represented Westbrook in litigation involving
matters in which they had substantially participated and in which they were likely to be called to testify.
Recognizing their ethical obligations, Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones referred the present case out to Westbrook's current
litigation counsel.

3

Snuffer was also involved communications with Westbrook both before and after the
actual settlement negotiations. Prior to the settlement negotiations, Snuffer discussed the Micron
easements, a key issue in the present lawsuit, with Jeff Anderson ("Anderson"), president of
SunCrest Development Corporation Deposition of Jeff Anderson, July 8, 2002 at 35-36
("Anderson Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit D. Snuffer told Anderson that Westbrook had
"easement rights out to U92." Id at 36. In addition, after the Settlement Agreement was signed,
Snuffer remained heavily involved in events related to this lawsuit. Snuffer corresponded with
various parties regarding such issues as the alignment of the proposed road that was to connect to
S.R. U-92. See, e.g., Snuffer Letter to Mike Mazuran, April 6, 2001; Snuffer Letter to Mike
Mazuran, April 11, 2001, attached hereto as Exhibit E. Furthermore, both before and after the
Settlement Agreement was signed, Snuffer was carbon copied on most letters written by Mast
and Christiansen. See, ej*., Mast Letter to Jeff Anderson, October 5, 2000, Christiansen Letter
to Jeff Anderson, January 27, 2000; Christiansen Letter to City of Draper, April 13, 2001,
attached hereto as Exhibit F. Lastly, Westbrook met with Mast and Snuffer to inform them of
Micron's unwillingness to allow the road to S.R. U-92 to be built on the west side of its property.
CUE
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISQUALIFY SNUFFER FROM REPRESENTING DJ. BECAUSE THIS REPRESENTATION VIOLATES THE
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND WILL TAINT
THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE.

This Court should disqualify Snuffer from further participation in this case because his
representation in the present lawsuit violates the ethical obligations of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct and will taint the legal proceedings in this case. The trial judge has the
4

power to control attorneys' conduct in trial litigation, including disqualifying counsel after
finding an ethical violation. Margulis v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,1199 (Utah 1985). Snuffer
has violated ethical Rule 3.7. Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule

3.7. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged

"the role of advocate and witness should be separated. If an attorney attempts to combine the
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both
as advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question.'" State v.
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669,671
(7th Cir. 1983); interpreting prior ethical Rule 5-102(A)). As the Comment to Rule 3.7 explains:
The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice
that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of
personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence
given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should
be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7, Comment

(emphasis added). Consequently,

"[t]he great weight of authority [] is that it is error for counsel to continue representation where
he or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues that are not incidental or
insignificant." Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. Since Snuffer is a "necessary" witness and his
disqualification would not "work a substantial hardship" on D.J., he should be disqualified from
any further representation of D.J. in this matter.
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A.

Snuffer is a Necessary Witness Because He Participated Extensively in
Settlement Negotiations and Has First-Hand Knowledge of Facts
Material to the Present Lawsuit.

Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is a "necessary" witness or "ought to be" one. A
lawyer is a "'necessary' witness if his or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable
elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc., v. Famous Artists Merchandising Exchange, Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 1297,1302 (D. Colo. 1994); see also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061,
1066 (Utah 1991) (noting that the "need for the testimony of counsel must be compelling and...
necessary"). Therefore, if the lawyer's testimony relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues,
withdrawal or disqualification may not be necessary. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. Furthermore,
the attorney does not necessarily have to be called as a witness; that the lawyer "ought to be a
witness" in the underlying action is enough. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653.
Specifically, where the attorney may be a witness because of his role as a negotiator or
drafter of an agreement, the general rule is that where "'a lawyer negotiates, executes and
administers a contract, and is the key witness at trial, he must be disqualified.'" Tiuman v.
Canant, No. 92 Civ. 5813 (JFK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6626, *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,1994). In
World Youth Day, the court disqualified a lawyer who had "first-hand non-privileged knowledge
of many relevant and material facts at issue in t[he] case." 866 F. Supp. at 1302. The lawyer had
"extensive involvement in the negotiation process," participated in telephone negotiations
directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim, and participated in numerous other communications
with the plaintiff. Id. at 1302. Furthermore, the lawyer's testimony was "essential in
establishing whether a valid and enforceable contract was initially formed." Id at 1303.
Likewise, the court in Acme Analgesics, Ltd. v. Lemmon Co., 602 F. Supp. 306, 306-307
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(S.D.N.Y. 1985), disqualified an attorney and his firm because he negotiated the contract upon
which the case was brought and would likely be a material witness at trial for that very reason.
Snuffer's involvement in the underlying events of the present lawsuit are almost identical
to the disqualified lawyers' involvement in World Youth Day and Acme Analgesics, given that
he participated in the negotiations and administration of the Settlement Agreement. First,
Snuffer had "extensive involvement in the negotiation process" and therefore participated in
events relevant to this lawsuit. He was one of the main negotiators on DJ.'s side, and as such,
participated in many of the negotiation sessions, including a key session held at his offices. See
Christiansen Dep. at 28, Ex. C. Furthermore, Snuffer "collaborated" with Westbrook's attorneys
on the drafts of the Settlement Agreement. Snuffer's testimony is critical in explaining the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement and in establishing the intent and
intended effect of the agreement. In particular, Christiansen does not remember many details
regarding the key meeting at Snuffer's office, but he does remember that the critical paragraph
14 of the Settlement Agreement was discussed. See icl at 28, 33-34, Ex. C. Snuffer's testimony
is needed to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the discussion of this critical paragraph
since he was DJ.'s only other representative at the meeting. Third, Snuffer had numerous
communications with Westbrook, including his discussion of the critical easements with
Anderson. See Anderson Dep. at 35-36, Ex. D. His knowledge regarding these easements is
critical to establishing whether Westbrook made false representations regarding these easements.
Furthermore, Snuffer participated in the administration of the agreement, corresponding with
various parties regarding such issues as the alignment of the proposed road that was to connect to
S.R. U-92. See, e^., Snuffer Letter to Mike Mazuran, April 6, 2001; Snuffer Letter to Mike
Mazuran, April 11, 2001. Furthermore, both before and after the Settlement Agreement was
7

signed, Snuffer was carbon copied on most letters written by Mast and Christiansen. See, e.g.,
Mast Letter to Jeff Anderson, October 5, 2000, Christiansen Letter to Jeff Anderson, January 27,
2000; Christiansen Letter to City of Draper, April 13, 2001. Snuffer was present when
Westbrook informed D.J. of Micron's unwillingness to allow Westbrook to build the road. This
conversation is critical to establishing the good faith belief of Westbook at the time of
negotiations and the subsequent change in circumstances.
Such involvement cannot be considered "incidental or insignificant." Instead, Snuffer's
knowledge regarding these events is "relevant, material, and unobtainable elsewhere," because
Snuffer has "first-hand knowledge" of many material facts related to the settlement negotiations
and events that took place both before and after the negotiations. Specifically, Snuffer is the
only witness on D.J.'s side who can give testimony regarding the key meeting that took place at
his offices. Given his "first-hand knowledge" of key, material facts, Snuffer "ought to be a
witness" in the present action and should therefore be disqualified.
B.

Snuffer's Disqualification Would Not Work a Substantial Hardship
on DJ. Because the Possibility Was Foreseeable, DJ. Has Sufficient
Funds to Obtain New Counsel, and the New Counsel Would Have
Ample Time to Prepare for Trial.

Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, even where a lawyer is found to be a
necessary witness and the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice, the lawyer will not be
disqualified where (1) "[t]he testimony relates to an uncontested issue, (2) "[t]he testimony
relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case"; or (3) "[disqualification of
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule

3.7. The Comment to the Rule states:

Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case,
the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the
8

lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such
prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be
given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both
parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.7, Comment. To determine whether the client

will suffer a "substantial hardship," the Utah Rules "recognize[] that a balancing is required
between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." Id; see World Youth Day,
866 F. Supp. 1297 (noting that "the underlying purpose of Rule 3.7 . . . is to avoid the prejudice
associated with the jury confusion resulting from an attorney acting as both advocate and
witness.")
In the present case, the only possible issue with regard to the disqualification exceptions
set forth in Rule 3.7 is whether D.J. will suffer a hardship if Snuffer is disqualified. The first two
exceptions to the disqualification rule clearly do not apply because Snuffer's testimony would
relate to a contested issue, the Settlement Agreement, and because the testimony is in no way
related to the value of legal services rendered.
Snuffer's disqualification will not "work a substantial hardship" on DJ. for a number of
reasons. First, D.J. "could reasonably foresee" that Snuffer would be a witness since he was
involved in all aspects of the settlement negotiations. See Mast Dep. at 75, Ex. B; Christiansen
Dep. at 21, Ex. C. Second, D.J. has the financial means to obtain new counsel. Third, the Court
has not scheduled a trial date and discovery, other than that pursuant to Rule 56(f), has just
begun, so new counsel would have more than enough time to prepare for trial competently. By
early disqualification, new counsel would have time to conduct discovery to support its theory of
the case to the extent that might differ from Snuffer's. Furthermore, Westbrook would be
prejudiced if Snuffer was not disqualified and allowed to testify since his roles as both advocate
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and witness may confuse the jury. Such dual roles would cause Snuffer to "be easily subject to
impeachment for interest and thus lessens his effectiveness as a witness." Leonard, 707 P.2d at
653 (quoting Commonwealth v. Floyd, 431 A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. 1981)). Consequently, D.J. will
not suffer a "substantial hardship" if Snuffer is disqualified.
II.

SNUFFER'S CONTINUED REPRESENTATION OF DJ. WOULD
CONFUSE THE ROLE OF ADVOCATE AND WITNESS AND
THEREFORE TAINT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
CASE.

Even where a court determines that a lawyer is a "necessary" witness, the court must still
analyze whether the proceedings could be conducted fairly were the lawyer allowed to
participate as both advocate and witness. Thus, the "critical inquiry is whether the litigation can
be conducted in fairness to all parties. Disqualification should not be imposed unless the claimed
misconduct in some way 'taints' the trial or the legal system." World Youth Day, 866 F. Supp.
at 1303 (emphasis added). Often, "there is a substantial risk that a jury will be confused by an
advocate also appearing as a witness. The jury may attribute too much or too little weight to [the
lawyer's] testimony because of his dual role." Id. Furthermore, where any "pretrial activity
includes obtaining evidence which, if admitted at trial, would reveal the attorney's dual role," the
lawyer should be disqualified from participation in any such activities. IdL; see also id. at 1304
(noting that "the testimony from oral depositions .. . cannot easily be taken and read into
evidence without revealing [the attorney's] identity as the deposing attorney").
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this matter would certainly confuse a jury
since he participated significantly in the events underlying this litigation. His testimony will be
crucial in determining the intended effect of the Settlement Agreement and whether Westbrook
made false representations to DJ. Thus, given that he was one of the principal negotiators of the
10

Settlement Agreement, the jury may attribute "too much or too little" weight to Snuffer's
testimony. This would be unfair for both sides and would certainly "taint" the trial.
Furthermore, Snuffer's continued participation in any pretrial activities would also be
unfair to both sides since these activities would likely reveal Snuffer's "dual role" as advocate
and witness. Not only will depositions in which he participated or may participate be read into
evidence, but Snuffer will himself probably be deposed. Additionally, D.J. has resisted
deposition questions involving Snuffer. See Mast Dep. at 34-36, 82,197-98, Ex. B; Christiansen
Dep. at 32-33, Ex. C. This resistance and continued representation can cloak collusion between
fact witnesses (Mast and Snuffer) with the attorney-client communication privilege. In doing
such, Westbrook's ability to rebut parol evidence is severely affected. That Westbrook can place
its own representatives on the stand regarding the negotiations is not the same as being able to
place representatives of D.J. on the stand to obtain inconsistencies in their accounts of the
negotiations. These circumstances are unfair and will certainly taint the proceedings. Therefore,
Snuffer should be disqualified from any further participation in this case.
CONCLUSION
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this case violates the ethical obligations of
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and taints any further proceedings in this
case. Therefore, the Court should disqualify Denver Snuffer.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 2004.
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Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness.

2

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a

3

necessary witness except where unless:

4

(a)(1) Tfre-the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

5

(a)(2) The-the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in

6
7
8

the case; or
(a)(3) Disqualification disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship
on the client.

9

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the-ajrial in which another lawyer in the

10

lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule

11

1.7 or Rule 1.9.

12

Comment

13

[11 Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the

14

opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

15

Advocate-Witness Rule

16

\2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or

17

misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has

18

proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the

19

litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an

20

advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not

21

be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an

22

analysis of the proof.

23

f31 To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously

24

serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in

25

paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will

26

be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2)

27

recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services

28

rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify

29

avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in

30

such a situation the judge has first hand firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue;
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hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the

32

testimony.

33

[41 Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is

34

required between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing

35

party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer

36

prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the

37

lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that

38

of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the

39

lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification

40

on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee

41

that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification

42

conflict of interest principles stated in Rale-Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 fras-have no

43

application to this aspect of the problem.

44

[5]_Whothor the combination of rolos involves an improper Because the tribunal is

45

not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer

46

in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer

47

to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest with respect to the client is

48

determined by Rule

49

Conflict of Interest

50

[61 In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer

51

will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give

52

rise to a conflict of interest that will reguire compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For

53

example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client

54

and that of the lawyer,, or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper

55

the representation involves a conflict of interest that reguires compliance with Rule 1.7.

56

This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a)

57

from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's

58

disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who

59

might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph

60

(a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether

61

the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing

Effective November 1, 2005
62

party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of

63

the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rulo 1.7. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm

64

may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of If there is a conflict of interest,

65

Rule 1.10 disqualifies the firm also, the lawyer must secure the client's informed

66

consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking

67

the client's consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in

68

writing" and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent."

69

[71 (Rule 3.8. Special responsibilities of a prosecutof4Paragraph (b) provides that a

70

lawyer is not disgualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the

71

lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however.

72

the testifying lawyer would also be disgualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from

73

representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from

74

representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the

75

conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

76

